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GROUP RIGHTS AND LEGAL PLURALISM
Natan Lerner*
INTRODUCTION
This Essay deals with a controversial issue in the area of group relations in
democratic states, namely the place of group rights in democratic societies and
the role of legal pluralism theories. Group rights are presently recognized as
entitled to, if not a treatment equal to that of individual rights, at least the
recognition of some form of legitimacy that justifies respect, consideration,
and protection. Underlying such legitimacy is a view that looks to ensuring
harmony between, and constructive coexistence of, the different components of
democratic societies. This was not always the case with classic international
law, which was not interested in the status and rights of groups, whatever their
nature. The new approach tended to favor minorities that were more or less
distinct from the majority of the respective populations, namely ethnic,
religious, cultural, or linguistic groups. Recently, some of those groups are
advancing a position quite different from the one that prevailed in earlier
international law, which ignored groups. Beyond the goal of receiving
recognition of their rights as a group, now more or less achieved, some groups
strive to have part of their value systems incorporated into the general, binding
legal systems of the state or to upgrade their traditional adjudication systems to
the category of law. While it is clear that, in the sphere of criminal law, liberal
democracies reject such aspirations, the situation is more fluid concerning
family law, and it is regarding this discipline that the controversy requires
attention.
This is particularly the case with religious groups because the press has
generally looked to religious groups when it deals with the trend of groups
asserting their rights.1 The claim that, given certain conditions, particular
religious traditions should be incorporated into general state legislation and
applied to individuals adhering to such traditions, is now being seriously
discussed. It has already engendered vigorous opposition not only in secularist
* Professor of Law, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya. Many thanks to my research associate, Stav
Cohen, for her most valuable help in the preparation of this Essay.
1 See, e.g., Sense About Sharia, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2010, at 16–18; Whose Law Counts Most?,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2010, at 71–72.
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quarters, but also among scholars advocating some accommodation between
the secular state and religious groups. Needless to say, the claim is that these
religious norms should be applied to only persons sharing the same tradition.
The interaction between minority groups and the state has developed
several models based on different historical contexts. In some states, diverse
religious communities enjoy wide legal and judicial autonomy, inherited from
situations that evolved under the Ottoman Empire or Western colonialism. In
addition, in recent decades, traditional forms of law and behavior of indigenous
populations are finding their way into international instruments, although in a
limited form and not readily accepted by all states. All this has supported the
argument that legal pluralism—as described in Part III—should be adopted by
plural societies. Prakash Shah, in a book dealing primarily with Great Britain,2
summarizes the current aspirations of legal pluralism, arguing that “the main
challenge must therefore be ceasing to assume that all are equal and
acknowledging that all are different, that all conceive of law in different ways,
and therefore demand different things and situation specific solutions.”3
I. THE EVOLUTION OF GROUP RIGHTS
A short historical overview of religious rights is provided to aid in
understanding modern group rights in relation to legal pluralism theories. A
few treaties, starting with the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which granted
religious rights to the Protestants in Germany, intended to protect members of
dissenting religions.4 The Treaty of Oliva (1660) contained provisions in favor
of Roman Catholics in Livonia, ceded by Poland to Sweden; the Treaty of
Ryswick (1697) protected Catholics in territories ceded by France to Holland;
and the Treaty of Paris (1763), between France, Spain, and Great Britain,
granted rights to Roman Catholics in the Canadian territories taken from

2 PRAKASH SHAH, LEGAL PLURALISM IN CONFLICT: COPING WITH CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN LAW (2005).
On Great Britain and its Muslim minority, see also Javaid Rehman, Religion, Minority Rights and Muslims of
the United Kingdom, in RELIGION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF
ISLAMIC STATE PRACTICES 521 (Javaid Rehman & Susan C. Breau eds., 2007). The author does not advocate
legal pluralism but rather an intensified struggle for nondiscrimination.
3 SHAH, supra note 2, at 173. There is an enormous collection of literature on legal pluralism. See, for
example, WILLIAM KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL ODYSSEYS: NAVIGATING THE NEW INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
OF DIVERSITY (2007), and former works of the same author. See also Ann Griffiths, Legal Pluralism, in AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY 289 (Reza Banakar & Max Travers eds., 2002); 9 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. (2008) (containing several articles on the subject).
4 NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (2d ed. 2003)
[hereinafter LERNER 2003].
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France.5 Later, the Congress of Vienna (1815), the Treaty of Berlin (1878), and
the Constantinople Convention (1881) protected Christian religious
minorities.6 A loose system of humanitarian diplomatic intervention of major
powers in favor of persecuted minorities also developed, producing measures
that acknowledged and protected the rights of groups. In the twentieth century,
in the interwar period, several treaties and unilateral declarations created the
“minorities system” under the aegis of the League of Nations, an interesting
but unsuccessful experiment that collapsed for political reasons during World
War II and was considered undesirable by the international community after
the defeat of Nazi Germany and its allies.7 The system ensured the enjoyment
of rights by specific minorities and its failure was the result of the conditions
prevailing in Europe on the eve of the 1939 war.8
When the United Nations (“UN”) was established in 1945 in San
Francisco, the majority of the founding members was not inclined to recognize
the rights of groups. Their approach was that human rights, as proclaimed in
the 1948 Universal Declaration,9 and the application of the rule of
nondiscrimination were enough to prevent crimes such as the Jewish
Holocaust—the most brutal assault upon a group, community, or minority in
modern times—or subsequent instances of genocide, a notion legally defined
only after the war. While the UN Charter forbids discrimination10—and race
and religion are clearly the main causes of discrimination and group
persecution—the United Nations was not ready, in its early years, to consider
group rights. An exception was the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which, by is own terms, is an
instrument aimed at protecting the existence—the fundamental human right—
of ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups.11

5

Id.
Id.
7 See, e.g., League of Nations Covenant art. 22.
8 See LERNER 2003, supra note 4, at 7–14 (chronicling religious rights embodied in these treaties). On
group rights, see generally GROUP RIGHTS (Peter Jones ed., 2009); GROUP RIGHTS (Judith Baker ed., 1994).
9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
10 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
11 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260 (III) A (Dec.
9, 1948) [hereinafter Convention on Genocide], available at http://www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html. Much
literature exists discussing genocide and the convention. See, e.g., ADAM JONES, GENOCIDE: A
COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2011); NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: ITS
ORIGINS AND INTERPRETATION (1949); WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF
CRIMES (2009).
6
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The 1966 Covenants followed the line of the UN Charter and downplayed
the group dimension. Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”) is considered a timid and reluctant recognition of
rights emanating from the existence of collective entities.12 However, by the
early sixties, the United Nations had already started a process that took notice
of the proliferation of attacks against racial and religious communities. This
process resulted in the adoption in 1965 of the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,13 and in 1981, after many political
difficulties, the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and
of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.14 These instruments evidence
the start of a new trend that considers the weight of group rights and needs.
The 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities15 somewhat ameliorated the
criticism of the approach taken in Article 27 of the ICCPR by urging states to
promote group identity.16 The International Labor Organization Convention
No. 169 on Indigenous Populations17 and the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous People (“2007 Declaration”)18 will be discussed further below.19

12 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR]. On the discussion of the reach of Article 27, see LERNER, supra note 4, at 14–15.
13 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195
[hereinafter Convention on Racial Discrimination]; see also NATAN LERNER, THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1980) (providing commentary on the
convention).
14 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion
or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., 73d plen. mtg., Supp. No. 151, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/55
(Nov. 25, 1981) [hereinafter 1981 Declaration]; see also NATAN LERNER, RELIGION, SECULAR BELIEFS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: 25 YEARS AFTER THE 1981 DECLARATION (2006) [hereinafter LERNER 2006] (commenting on
the twenty-fifth anniversary of the declaration).
15 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic
Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/135/Annex (Dec. 18, 1992) [hereinafter 1992
Declaration].
16 Although acknowledging that the 1981 Declaration might mean “little change in reality,” scholar
Christian Joppke finds “more multicultural diction” in the declaration. Christian Joppke, Minority Rights for
Immigrants? Multiculturalism Versus Antidiscrimination, 43 ISR. L. REV. 49, 51 (2010). Joppke claims that
multiculturalism is in retreat, while antidiscrimination is going from strength to strength, but his focus is on
minority rights for immigrants, the nucleus of which are alien rights. Id. at 61. He does not refer to religious
and religious related rights. Id.
17 Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, 1650
U.N.T.S. 383 [hereinafter 1989 Convention].
18 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, 61st Sess., 107th
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples].
19 See infra Part IV.
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Against this background, it is necessary to establish which groups are likely to
play a role in a society where legal pluralism is being advocated.
II. THE RELEVANT GROUPS
Not every conglomerate, reunion, or association of persons, even if it is
permanent and responds to an evident public interest, constitutes a group in the
sense relevant to this Essay. The pertinent groups are also called
communities20 or minorities,21 sometimes peoples, and are essentially different
from associations or organizations created by the free will of their members to
achieve some aim or defend some interests. There are essentially three relevant
groups, communities, or minorities: ethnic, religious, and linguistic or
cultural.22 All these groups are spontaneous, as differentiated from voluntary;
relatively permanent, in the sense that it is very difficult and in some cases
impossible to opt out of them; and their members usually identify with the
whole and share a feeling of belonging, of solidarity.23 All of them have
essentially a double aspiration: perfect equality with all other persons and the
preservation of their distinct characteristics.24 This Essay will deal mainly with
one of these three groups in connection with the issue of legal pluralism—
religious groups or communities.
These three groups have rights, a fact which is today more or less
acknowledged by international and state law. The catalog of those rights
differs from group to group, but, as generally listed in several modern
international instruments and summarized in Group Rights and Discrimination
in International Law,25 such rights include:

20 U.N. Secretary-General, Definition and Classification of Minorities, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN/4/Sub.2/85
(Dec. 27, 1949) (defining communities as “groups based upon unifying and spontaneous (as opposed to
artificial or planned) factors essentially beyond the control of the members of the group”).
21 There are numerous definitions of the term “minority.” Francesco Capotorti, Special Rapporteur
appointed by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the United
Nations to prepare a study on the subject, suggests an authoritative definition. He describes a minority as “a
group which is numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state and in a non-dominant position,
whose members possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the rest of the
population and who, if only implicitly, maintain a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture,
traditions, religion or language.” The groups relevant to this Essay are precisely those having the indicated
characteristics. F. Capotorti, Minorities, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 385, 390 (1985).
22 See Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 64, at 1 (Apr. 6),
available at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1935.04.06_albania.htm.
23 See id. at 23.
24 See id.
25 LERNER 2003, supra note 4.
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(a) The right to existence of the group as such, depending on the right
to life of its individual members and protected by the 1948
Convention Against Genocide;26
(b) The right to nondiscrimination. UN covenants and instruments on
racial and religious discrimination and intolerance, as well as the
International Labor Organization (“ILO”) and UN Educational,
Scientific
and
Cultural
Organization
(“UNESCO”)
antidiscrimination treaties, protect this right. The right to
nondiscrimination, grounded in the principle of equality, is, like
the right to existence, a basic human right granted to every
individual person. Its violation, however, is also a denial of the
rights of the group to which the individual belongs;
(c) The right to identity, namely the right of the group to preserve and
develop its different group characteristics, in addition to its right to
equality in the enjoyment of all general liberties;
(d) The right to special measures needed for the preservation of its
identity and to ensure its equality within society. International law
proclaims this right, provided it is necessary and temporary, until
equality is achieved. Article 2 of the Convention Against Racial
Discrimination determines the reach and limitations of this right,
which is frequently described as affirmative action;27
(e) The right to regulate membership in the group. This may in some
cases clash with the rights of the individual, including the right to
opt out of or return to the group. The state or the international
community may in some cases be called to decide complicated
issues of group membership;28
(f) The right to establish and manage institutions, with due regard to
the public law of the country;
(g) The rights to communicate, federate, and cooperate with similar
groups within the country or abroad. This right is of special
importance for religious groups;
(h) In some legal systems, the right to representation in various
governmental branches. Legal instruments on indigenous
populations and minorities refer to such rights;
26

Convention on Genocide, supra note 11.
Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 13, art. 2.
28 See Lovelace v. Canada, Comm. No. R. 6/24, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/44) at 166 (1981)
(discussing membership in an Indian group, which caused Canada to amend its Indian Act), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/session36/6-24.htm.
27
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(i) The right to impose duties and taxes on members in order to
maintain churches, institutions, or schools, according to the nature
of the group. In several countries, the group may be entitled to
receive a proportional share of public funds;
(j) Some groups may enjoy a right to legal personality, at the national
and even international levels;
(k) Some groups, particularly those characterized as peoples, may
enjoy the right to self-determination, strictly interpreted in
accordance with international law and the public law of the
country, and related to issues such as autonomy and regionalism.29
Article 6 of the 1981 Declaration proclaims some rights particularly
necessary for the life of religious institutions.30 They include:
(a) The freedom to worship and related rights;
(b) The freedom to make, acquire, and use the necessary articles and
materials related to the rites of a particular religion;
(c) The freedom to teach a religion or belief and write and publish
relevant materials;
(d) The right to solicit and receive voluntary financial support;
(e) The freedom to train and appoint religious leaders and
functionaries;
(f) The right to observe and celebrate holy days and ceremonies in
accordance with the precepts of the respective religion.31
Special problems exist in connection with the freedom of association and
the extent of autonomy to be enjoyed by religious groups.32
The preceding list of rights reflects the present stage of development of
international law and human rights law concerning group rights. This picture is
far away from some of the aspirations referred to at the beginning of these
pages. The following Part addresses the trends and arguments used to advocate
a more diversified approach on the basis of the views voiced by spokespersons

29 See LERNER 2003, supra note 4, at 39–41. For rights of religious groups, see 1981 Declaration, supra
note 14, art. 6; LERNER 2006, supra note 14, at 32–33.
30 1981 Declaration, supra note 14, art. 6.
31 See id.; see also Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting 1996 of the Representatives of the
Participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, available at www.osce.org/mc/
40881.
32 See Natan Lerner, Religion and Freedom of Association, in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN
INTRODUCTION (John Witte, Jr. & M. Christian Green eds., 2011).
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for legal pluralism, in its different expressions as resulting from the diverse
stages of its evolution.
III. LEGAL PLURALISM
Legal pluralism is a controversial notion that, since the 1970s, has
penetrated not only the area of law, but also the fields of sociology,
anthropology, and political science. It is presently an intensely disputed issue
regarding relations between state and religion. According to scholar Anne
Griffiths, the term encompasses “diverse and often contested perspectives on
law, ranging from the recognition of differing legal orders within the nationstate, to a more far reaching and open-ended concept of law that does not
necessarily depend on state recognition for its validity” and “may come into
being wherever two or more legal systems exist in the same social field.”33
Legal pluralism, as described by the editors of a timely academic publication,
disputes “the legal-centralist notion that state law is exclusive; legal pluralists
assert and explore the proposition that non-state legal systems exist alongside
state law and are not necessarily subordinate to it.”34 The authors of the
preceding description add that research on multiculturalism “challenges the
legal-centralist notion of uniform nation-state law by debating the extent to
which today’s multicultural states, inhabited by multiple national, religious or
ethnic groups, should allow non-state (often illiberal) law to apply to the lives
of their citizens.”35
Several stages can be seen in the evolution of legal pluralism theories.
Some scholars distinguish between an early period, described as a weak,
juristic, or classic form of legal pluralism, and a second stage of strong, deep,
or new legal pluralism.36 There seems to be a correlation between this
development and that of the theories on multiculturalism.37 However, they are
different phenomena, and it is necessary to acknowledge that difference.
Kymlicka, replying at a symposium on his 2007 book to criticism of that book,
makes clear the differences.38
33 Griffiths, supra note 3, at 289. The book carries a comprehensive bibliography for “an overview of the
field.” Id. at 290, n.2.
34 Introduction to 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 343, 343 (2008).
35 Id.
36 See Griffiths, supra note 3, at 296.
37 See generally KYMLICKA, supra note 3; Amnon Rubinstein, The Decline, But Not Demise, of
Multiculturalism, 40 ISR. L. REV. 763, 765–66 (2007).
38 William Kymlicka, Reply, 2 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 91, 95 (2010). Kymlicka claims that in no
case has multiculturalism “been interpreted as a license for immigrant groups to maintain illiberal
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A number of developments, empirical and theoretical, influenced the
evolution of legal pluralism. Globalization, the growing body of law—in a
broad sense—produced by interstate organizations, and the contribution of
religious movements39 played a role in the development of legal pluralism
theories. The law of indigenous populations incorporated into state law in
postcolonialist situations, as well as the preservation of autonomous
community status in some countries that inherited the recognized communities
system prevailing under Ottoman and colonialist law, are additional examples
of the coexistence of a state legal regime with non-state legal regimes
applicable to portions of the population, and are summarized later in this
Essay.40 Feminist theories, as well as migrations and the formation of new
minorities—in either a strict sense or a flexible approach—also had an impact
on the development of legal pluralism. Such impacts were influenced by the
social and political conditions prevailing in the various, affected countries yet,
in general, were instrumental in the consolidation of legal pluralism theories
and practice.
What is called the new, “strong” legal pluralism counteracts the idea that
all legal ordering is rooted in state law. Its proponents speak about “integral
plurality,” “porous legality,” or “legal porosity” and reorienting legal analysis
away from the ideology of legal centralism, conducing to “a framework of
understanding the dynamics of the imposition of law and of resistance to it.”41
Legal pluralists refer to a process in which state law coexists with religious
law, local normative orders, and customary law.42
Christine Parker points out that, historically, customary and religious law
existed before the modern nation-state.43 Such law continues to exist side by
side with the law of the state in postcolonial and multicultural societies like
India and Israel.44 In federal states like Australia and Canada, indigenous
peoples’ law coexists with state law, and local law may sometimes conflict

practices . . . . It has always been seen as part and parcel of a larger process of integrating immigrants into a
liberal-democratic constitutional order.” Id.
39 See Griffiths, supra note 3, at 298.
40 See infra Part IV.
41 Griffiths, supra note 3, at 304. Griffiths quotes from several authors pertaining to the “new, strong, or
deep legal pluralism.” Id. at 302.
42 Id. at 309. Griffiths argues that this would provide “a more detailed comprehension of the ways in
which ethnonationalist movements work, as well as a more comprehensive understanding of the factors
underlying religious movements which cut across national boundaries.” Id.
43 Christine Parker, The Pluralization of Regulation, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 349, 352 (2008).
44 Id.

LERNER GALLEYSFINAL2

838

11/16/2011 3:50 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

with national law.45 Legal pluralism is even more obvious in transnational
communities, especially the European Union.46 Beyond that, Parker argues that
contemporary societies utilize a range of other legal “systems, normative
orderings and symbolic meaning systems” that could also be described as
“law.”47 Such “law” is generated by bodies such as families, corporations,
ethnic and religious groups, friendship groups, and other “semi-autonomous
social fields,” and may have more influence on some people than the official
law.48
The issues discussed in this Essay are the reach and the limits of such an
“extended” view of legal pluralism, particularly against the background of
attempts to “upgrade” religious laws and make them mandatory under the law
of the state, either by incorporating them into the state framework or otherwise
attaching to them the authority of the state. Those attempts do not involve the
claim that the voluntary use of religious law should be restricted, except when
opposed to public order or basic human rights as part of state law. There is also
no serious attempt to give legal force to criminal norms of religious
communities. The issue is whether what is seen as legitimate, voluntary
arbitration can be made mandatory under general law. The real difficulty,
addressed in The Economist in relation to Islamic law, comes “where it
pertains to family matters.”49 For the purposes of this Essay, legal pluralism
dealing with corporate business or other social or economic organizational
structures is not relevant; it is the claim to recognize traditional religious or
ethno-religious regulations as law, beyond purely voluntary arrangements, that
constitutes the main issue of this Essay.
This issue has become highly controversial in some countries and in some
cases, as in Canada, it has produced legislative changes.50 Ayelet Shachar
refers to the demands in Canada “to accommodate religious diversity in the
public sphere.”51 She finds a new challenge in the request to “privatize
diversity” through alternative dispute resolution processes that permit parties to
move their disputes from public courts into the domain of religious or

45

Id.
Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Sense About Sharia, supra note 1.
50 See Family Statute Amendment Act, S.O. 2006, c.1 (Can.); Ayelet Shachar, Privatizing Diversity: A
Cautionary Tale from Religious Arbitration in Family Law, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 573 (2008).
51 Shachar, supra note 50, at 573.
46
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customary sources of law and authority.52 Shachar concludes that “a dualstatus system with no communication between the two branches” may come
into operation, proving that the debate over the role of Sharia tribunals is not
over.53
John Witte, Jr. and Joel A. Nichols have dealt with the limits and lessons of
accommodation between state law and faith-based family laws in the context
of the debate launched by Anglican Archbishop Rowan Williams in 2008 on
the possibilities of such accommodation between Muslim family law and the
legal systems prevailing in Western democracies.54 Witte and Nichols point out
that the issue is not respect for religious freedom and rights, but Muslim
demands for state enforcement of Muslim marriage contracts and religious
arbitration of family law and other disputes.55 For obvious historical and social
reasons, the debate concerns primarily marriage law with all its complex
implications, both in civil and in criminal law.56 Marriage law in Western
societies has undergone far-reaching changes in the direction of privatization,57
and the present discussion regards the extent to which that process can be taken
further. Although the issue affects several communities of faith, the discussion,
as we have seen, deals mainly with Muslim communities that have immigrated
into the West.58 There are several reasons that caused Muslim immigrant
communities to be at the forefront of this situation, including political reactions
in some countries and dramatic events of terrorism involving Muslims that
have been generalized to the larger Muslim population.59
Witte and Nichols indicate that Muslim communities aspire to put Sharia
laws and their voluntary use by Muslims on “firmer constitutional and cultural
ground in the West.”60 In liberal democracies there is considerable opposition
to such aspirations.61 Such opposition is based on the concern that state
enforcement would result in cases where religious law may exceed purely
52

Id.
Id. at 607.
54 John Witte, Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, Faith-Based Family Laws in Western Democracies?, 2010 FIDES ET
LIBERTAS 122. Professor Witte also discussed this issue at a workshop on Family, State, and Religion at the
Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Israel, on May 28, 2010.
55 Id. at 123.
56 Id. at 125.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 122–23.
59 Id. at 127.
60 Id.
61 See, e.g., John F. Burns, Prime Minister Criticizes British ‘Multiculturalism’ As Allowing Extremism,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2011, at 6.
53
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voluntary arbitration and reach matters not concerning public order or basic
human rights.62 Witte and Nichols point out that “[r]eligious groups in the
West have long enjoyed corporate free exercise rights to legal personality,
corporate property, collective worship, organized charity, parochial education,
freedom of press,” and many other legitimate rights.63 They question why
Muslim religious groups should not enjoy the right to govern the marital and
family lives of their voluntary members when Christians and Orthodox Jews,
as well as smaller groups, have developed their own voluntary courts and
institutions.64 Nobody is demanding “exemptions from criminal laws against
activities like polygamy, child marriage, female genital mutilation, or corporal
discipline of wives.”65 Western Muslims enjoy general religious freedom, but
some Muslims advocate special accommodations that are unacceptable to
Western democracies.66 No democratic state can delegate to a religious group
the full legal power to govern the domestic affairs of their faithful in
accordance with their own religious laws.67
The Muslim claim that Sharia provides a comprehensive law governing
sex, marriage, and family life makes accommodation more difficult.68 A state
cannot give up its coercive power in this sphere.69 Jewish law courts’ easy
acceptance of voluntary arbitration is grounded in Jewish disputants’
acceptance of the supremacy of state law.70 Muslims could obtain a similar
result only after a prolonged adjustment to Western life, which would
eventually dispel the current suspicions. A similar process took place in the
area of education and religion.71

62 The subject attracted wide public attention while this Essay was being written in relation with British
Prime Minister David Cameron’s statement opposing forms of cultural pluralism involving legal autonomy for
minorities, in particular Muslim immigrants in Great Britain. See id. Political leaders of Germany and France
made similar statements. See Nicolas Sarkozy Declares Multiculturalism Had Failed, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 11,
2011, 1:32 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/8317497/Nicolas-Sarkozydeclares-multiculturalism-had-failed.html; Matthew Weaver, Angela Merkel: German Multiculturalism Has
‘Utterly Failed,’ GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 2010, 11:58 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/17/
angela-merkel-german-multiculturalism-failed.
63 Witte & Nichols, supra note 54, at 127.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 129.
66 Id. at 129–30.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 130.
69 Id. at 131.
70 Id. at 132–33.
71 Id. at 133–34.
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Advocates of legal pluralism perceive a threefold structure of law—
“official law,” “unofficial law,” and “legal postulates”—as more or less
corresponding to Western conceptions of law—“positive law,” “customary
law,” and “natural law.”72 Official law is made or sanctioned by the state.
Unofficial law is, in practice, sanctioned by a general consensus.73 Legal
postulates are systems of values or ideals that are related to the fundamental
social structure.74 Examples of legal postulates include the caste system, lineal
descent, clan unity, exogamy, and philosophical and political ideologies.75
Prakash Shah refers to “diasporic legal cultures” and a “jurisprudence of
difference.”76 He points out that “people are often compelled to act against the
(official) law when seeking to conform to their religious beliefs.”77 He claims
that law can be generated by different sources, whether recognized by the state
or not.78 Modern states have tended “to operate on the premise that,
particularly in the realm of family law, the customary and religious law of the
group concerned prevails, and should generally govern the relations among
members of that group”; this is the result of continuing to maintain systems of
personal law of Asian and African legal systems.79 Such an evaluation may be
too general.
Historically, there are two areas where the ideas of legal pluralism have
flourished. One area in which legal pluralism has been accepted and where its
principles have even penetrated international norms is the rights of indigenous
populations or peoples. A second area where there is an empirical example of
legal pluralism is the situation concerning recognized religious communities.
These two examples deserve to be treated separately.
IV. INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS
Differences are often implied between the terms “populations” or “peoples”
regarding the nature of the rights enjoyed by indigenous groups and their
meaning in the definitions of such groups, particularly from an international

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

See SHAH, supra note 2, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7, 13.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 90.
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law viewpoint.80 Peoples are entitled to self-determination, as this term is
understood presently in international law. It was only after the recognition of
group rights in recent instruments, and active lobbying by spokespersons of
indigenous groups, that international law abandoned its traditional approach to
the problems of such populations and steps were taken, mainly by the ILO and
the United Nations, to incorporate the subject in international legislative texts,
albeit not to the full satisfaction of the interested groups. In the League of
Nations era, under Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, such
populations were seen as not yet able to stand on their own.81 Therefore, their
well-being was considered a “sacred trust of civilisation” to be achieved by
securing, in the words of Article 23 of the Covenant, “just treatment of the
native inhabitants of territories under their control.”82 During this period,
agreements concluded with indigenous groups were not reputed treaties
according to international law, and the Permanent Court of International
Justice denied international legal personality to aboriginal tribes.83
In the UN era, Article 1 of the Charter and Articles 1 of both Human Rights
Covenants referred to self-determination of “peoples”, but this notion was not
elaborated.84 Third World countries understood the right to self-determination
to refer strictly to colonial situations. Early human rights instruments, at the
global as well as the regional levels, did not refer to the indigenous issue. The
ILO was an exception to this trend, and its legislative work reflects the relevant
changes in approach. It was not until 1986 that the United Nations directly
addressed the issue.85 UN Special Rapporteur, Jose R. Martinez Cobo, defined
indigenous communities, peoples, and nations as those
having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial
societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves
distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those
territories or part of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors
of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to
80 LERNER 2003, supra note 4, at 111–24; see also S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996).
81 See League of Nations Covenant, supra note 7, art. 22.
82 Id. art. 22, paras. (1), 23(b).
83 Cf. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53 (Apr. 5); Island
of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
84 See ICCPR, supra note 12; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
85 Special Rapporteur of the Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4 (1987) (by J.R. Martinez Cobo).
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future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity,
as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance
86
with their cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.

This definition already shows the relevance of legal pluralism to the condition
of indigenous groups. As this Essay discusses below, this is also evident in the
changes to the ILO conventions and in the United Nations’ latest approach to
the issue. Kymlicka indicates that the problem facing many indigenous
peoples, particularly in Latin America, is that they have no self-governing
power to amend their customary law: “They have the right to follow
indigenous law, but not to make indigenous law. They have the right to live
according to their laws, but not the right to give themselves laws.”87
The ILO dealt with indigenous rights in two conventions, the 1957
Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention (No. 107) and the 1989
Convention (No. 169), which is a revision of the former.88 The changes in the
title and text of the 1989 Preamble are indicative of the prevailing spirit.89 The
word “integration” was dismissed from the preamble and reference is made to
the need to adopt new international standards “with a view to removing the
assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards.”90 The 1989 Convention
recognizes the aspirations of the indigenous peoples to exercise control over
their own institutions, ways of life, and economic development and to develop
their identities, languages, and religions “within the framework of the States in
which they live.”91 Their social and cultural identity, their customs and
traditions, and their institutions should be respected. Article 8, which caused
substantial objections, determines that when applying national legislation to
the peoples concerned, due regard shall be had for their customary law, which
they will have the right to retain except when it is “incompatible with
fundamental rights defined by the national legal system and with
internationally recognised human rights.”92
Articles 9 and 10 consider penal matters.93 These articles indicate that the
customs of indigenous peoples in such matters should be taken into
86

Id. at 4.
KYMLICKA, supra note 3, at 153.
88 1989 Convention, supra note 17; Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous
and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, June 2, 1957, 328 U.N.T.S. 247.
89 See 1989 Convention, supra note 17.
90 Id. pmbl.
91 Id.
92 Id. art. 8(2).
93 Id. arts. 9, 10.
87
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consideration.94 Furthermore, Article 17, which provoked many controversies,
provides that the rights of ownership and possession over the lands that the
peoples concerned “traditionally occupy” shall be recognized and contains
protective measures for the transfer of lands, the capacity to alienate them, and
other related matters.95
The 1989 Convention means that some rules concerning legal pluralism
have been modestly accepted by positive international law. The United Nations
followed a similar orientation in the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.96 The declaration recognizes in the preamble the need to
respect and promote the “inherent rights of indigenous peoples which derive
from their political, economic and social structures and from their cultures,
spiritual traditions, histories and philosophies, especially their rights to their
lands, territories and resources.”97 The preamble also refers to the rights
affirmed in treaties between states and indigenous peoples and to their
collective rights; the right to autonomy or self-government in matters related to
their internal and local affairs and the right to maintain and strengthen their
distinct political, legal, economic, social, and cultural institutions; the
elimination of forced assimilation and destruction of indigenous culture; the
right to choose their representatives and participate in decision-making on
matters that would affect their rights; and respect for their customs, traditions,
and land tenure systems.98
Article 27 of the 2007 Declaration can be seen as reflecting legal pluralist
theories.99 States should give “due recognition to indigenous peoples’ laws,
traditions, customs and land tenure systems . . . pertaining to their lands,
territories and resources,” establishing and implementing, to that effect, “a fair,
independent, impartial, open and transparent process,” in which indigenous
peoples shall have the right to participate.100 They have the right—proclaims
Article 33—“to determine their own identity or membership in accordance
with their customs and traditions.”101 They have the right—states Article 34—
“to promote, develop and maintain their . . . procedures, practices and, in the
cases where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance with
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Id.
Id. art. 17.
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 18.
Id. pmbl.
Id.
See id. art. 27.
Id.
Id. art. 33.
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international human rights standards.”102 Furthermore, Article 40 calls for “due
consideration to the customs, traditions, rules and legal systems of the
indigenous peoples concerned.”103
It is needless to stress that the 2007 Declaration is not a mandatory
treaty.104 Still, several countries voted against it or abstained, and concerns
were voiced with respect to its wording.105 One significant example is the
statement of Canada’s representative to the United Nations, Ambassador John
McNee, during the General Assembly session that adopted the declaration.
McNee denied the legal effect of the declaration, affirming that “its provisions
do not represent customary international law.”106 This lack of agreement
indicates the restricted approach of international law with regard to the
demands of legal pluralists.
Forms of legal pluralism have been incorporated in some national legal
systems rather than at the international level. Examples of such incorporation
are laws that recognize religious communities as entitled to a large degree of
legal autonomy, particularly with regard to family law, education, and
linguistic rights.
A special case is that of the Bedouin, a traditionally nomadic Muslim
population that developed a system of law “that emerged in the deserts of the
Middle East to provide protection to individuals and nomadic society alike,” in
the absence of any other authority in the desert.107 Such authority exists
presently, but the Bedouin still turn to their own laws, which sometimes clash
with state law.108 Taking issue with the claim that Bedouin law is, in fact,
lawless, Clinton Bailey argues “that Bedouin in modern times still resort, with
trust and hope for justice, to the legal system that their earliest ancestors
bequeathed them speaks volumes for the soundness of its ways.”109

102

Id. art. 34.
Id. art. 40.
104 See Canada Votes ‘No’ As UN Native Rights Declaration Passes, CBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2007, 4:07
PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2007/09/13/canada-indigenous.html.
105 Id.
106 John McNee, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Can. to the United Nations, Statement to the
61st Session of the General Assembly on the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007),
http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ap/ia/stmt/2007/undir-eng.asp.
107 See CLINTON BAILEY, BEDOUIN LAW FROM SINAI AND THE NEGEV: JUSTICE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT 1
(2009).
108 Id.
109 Id. at 301.
103
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V. RECOGNIZED COMMUNITIES WITH SEPARATE LEGAL SYSTEMS
States that were established as a consequence of the disruption of the
Ottoman Empire or the end of colonial regimes have maintained the legal
rights enjoyed formerly by minority religious communities, particularly with
regard to family law. Such are the cases of Israel, India, and South Africa,110
among others. The Ottoman rulers permitted non-Muslim religious
communities to enjoy autonomy in legal matters, which were applied by their
own courts.111 The system was called Millet.112 The Mejelle, the Islamic civil
law, governed the same issues for Muslims.113 In the case of Israel, the British
Mandate over Palestine, established under the League of Nations, maintained
the Millet system by incorporating it into Article 83 of the Palestine Order in
Council of 1922.114 After the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, no changes
were introduced in this respect, and the new state recognized additional
communities.115 There are today thirteen recognized communities in Israel,
several of which have their own courts for issues of personal status.116 This
does not mean that persons belonging to non-recognized communities do not
enjoy religious freedom; it means that some recognized religious communities
enjoy the additional privilege of having their own tribunals and applying, with
certain limitations, their own law, whether written or customary.117
The Jewish community in Israel is ruled by state law, but family matters are
reserved to rabbinical tribunals that have jurisdiction over all Jews and apply to
them the Halakha, Jewish religious law.118 A similar jurisdiction is granted to
other recognized communities over their adherents. Still, the actions of all state
institutions in the religious sphere are subject to review by the High Court of
Justice, including matters pertaining to the application of religious law.119
Religious courts exceed their jurisdiction if they issue judgments contrary to

110 See T W Bennett, Legal Pluralism and the Family in South Africa: Lessons from Customary Law
Reform, infra this issue, for a discussion of family law in South Africa.
111 Daphna Hacker, Religious Tribunals in Democratic States: Lessons from the Israeli Rabbinical Courts
(Tel Aviv Univ., Working Paper No. 123, 2011), available at http://law.bepress.com/taulwps/fp/art123/.
112 Id. at 5.
113 See AMIRA EL-AZHARY SONBOL, WOMEN OF JORDAN: ISLAM, LABOR AND THE LAW 20 (2003).
114 Hacker, supra note 111, at 5.
115 Id.; see LERNER 2006, supra note 14, at 201–11; Hacker, supra note 111, at 5.
116 Hacker, supra note 111, at 6.
117 Id.
118 See Chief Rabbinate of Israel Law, 5740-1980, 34 LSI 97 (1980).
119 See Initial Report of States Parties Due in 1993, Human Rights Committees, Apr. 9, 1998, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/81/Add.13 at 171 (June 2, 1998) [hereinafter Initial Report].
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provisions of secular laws regarding equal rights for women, adoption, and
spousal economic relations.120
The system has been criticized for several reasons. Some criticize the fact
that persons considered Jews for the purpose of the Population Register are
automatically under the jurisdiction of the rabbinical courts regardless of the
individual’s will or self-definition. Other criticisms include the strict
application of Halakhic norms to individuals who consider themselves secular
persons and do not wish to undergo religious ceremonies for the purpose of
marriage or divorce.121 The system of recognized religious communities also
has implications for taxation and financial support because only recognized
communities enjoy some benefits.122
In India, the British colonial authorities introduced a general territorial law,
but applied, in issues related to family law in the regular courts, the Quranic
law to the Muslims and the Shastra law to the Hindus.123 In time, distinctive
bodies of Anglo-Hindu and Anglo-Muslim case law evolved, and the courts of
British India and later the state courts of independent India applied these
bodies of personal law.124 Though the 1950 Constitution “appears to envision
the dissolution of the personal law system in favor of a Uniform Civil
Code,”125 the personal law system has been preserved, and certain family law
issues are still governed by separate Hindu, Muslim, Parsee, and Christian
religious laws.126 There has been, however, an evolution toward permitting the
application of personal law on a voluntary basis.127
VI. LEGAL PLURALISM AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES
An intense controversy is now taking place with regard to the application of
the principles of legal pluralism to groups of new immigrants and their
descendants, also described as “new minorities.” Resistance to considering
groups of immigrants as new minorities was first expressed when the ICCPR

120

See Chief Rabbinate Law of Israel, 34 LSI 97; Initial Report, supra note 119, at 171.
Marc Galanter & Jayanth Kriushnan, Personal Law and Human Rights in India and Israel, 34 ISR. L.
REV. 101, 122–23 (2000).
122 See Initial Report, supra note 119 (providing an authoritative description of the Israeli system).
123 See Marc Galanter, The Displacement of Traditional Law in Modern India, 24 J. SOC. ISSUES,
Oct. 1968, at 65.
124 Galanter & Kriushnan, supra note 121, at 106–07.
125 Id. at 107.
126 Id. at 109.
127 Id. at 130–31.
121
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was drafted. Spokespersons of immigrant-receiving countries claimed “that
persons of similar background who entered their territories voluntarily, through
a gradual process of immigration, could not be regarded as minorities, as this
would endanger the national integrity of the receiving States.”128 Although the
newcomers would enjoy individual rights, including linguistic and religious
rights, “they were expected to become part of the national fabric.”129 In
response, it was pointed out that dispersed religions may not receive the
protection of Article 27 of the ICCPR and that “the bias against the creation of
new minorities, encapsulated by the requirement of pre-existence, indicates
that recently formed religions could be treated differently than traditional ones
under the provision.”130 Article 27 engendered many discussions as to its
reach.131 The 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities was written in a mildly more
group-oriented language, but did not change the approach of the international
community to the place and rights of minorities in democratic countries.132
The issue today is not related to recently formed religious groups. Mostly,
the controversy refers to Muslim communities, particularly in Europe, and
focuses on the resort to Sharia norms instead of, or in addition to, general
family law, on a mandatory basis. At the beginning of this Essay, reference
was made to the impact of this discussion on general organs of the world
press.133 The discussion also involves politicians and legal commentators and
has become a major issue in international life.134 The issue is not so much legal
pluralism as the present state and future of multiculturalism. The controversy
reached a peak with a statement made in February 2011 by British Prime
Minister David Cameron proclaiming the failure of multiculturalism in Great
Britain, following similar pronouncements by German Chancellor Angela
Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy.135 Such statements, seen against
the background of dramatic international developments in parts of the Muslim
world, led qualified observers to point out a higher level of Islamic extremism
128

See MARC BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES” OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT
496 (1987).

ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
129 Id.

130 See Bernardette Meyler, The Limits of Group Rights: Religious Institutions and Religious Minorities in
International Law, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 535, 548–49 (2007).
131 See LERNER 2003, supra note 4, at 14–15. Beyond that debate, Article 27 is the most important
positive mandatory provision concerning minorities in international law. See ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 27.
132 1992 Declaration, supra note 15.
133 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
134 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
135 See id.
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and that the “advocacy of Muslim exceptionalism (such as the use of Shariah)”
was becoming “more mainstream” among Muslims.136
As indicated, the problem is mainly European. In this respect, Kymlicka
stresses the importance of size and proportion of the immigrant groups.137 This
explains the differences between North America and Europe. In the United
States or Canada, no one equates the category of “immigrant” with the
category of “Muslim.”138 When “bad” immigrants are seen as the prime
beneficiaries of multiculturalism—and the same would certainly apply to legal
pluralism—public support for multiculturalism can “dramatically diminish,
leading to high-profile cases of retreat.”139 There has, however, been strong
resistance in North America to attempts at establishing legal pluralism for
Muslim groups, as shown by the cases in Ontario and Oklahoma. In Ontario,
Canada, the acceptance of private arbitration for family disputes on the basis of
Sharia was dropped, and in Oklahoma, United States, a “Save Our State
Amendment,” preemptively banning Sharia law, was passed late in 2010,
although later blocked.140
CONCLUSION
In any case, it is with regard to immigrant groups, of a religious or an
ethnic-religious nature, and specifically Muslims, that the main discussion on
the applicability of legal pluralism is presently taking place. There are no
objections to the use of Muslim religious law concerning family rights and
duties on a purely voluntary basis, anywhere in the world, in a similar way to
what is currently happing with the voluntary application of religious norms in

136 John Vinocur, Commentary, British Shift on Muslims Is Ominous, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 1, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/world/europe/01iht-politicus01.html. John Vinocur (Politicus) criticizes
Cameron’s failure in making proposals to “deal with the scale of the problem of Muslim immigration.” Id. The
same day, in the same newspaper, Judy Dempsey wrote about the reaction to a speech made by Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan during a visit to Dusseldorf calling upon “our children,” namely the children
of Turkish immigrants, to learn Turkish prior to German. Judy Dempsey, German Politicians Assail Turkish
Leader over Cultural Remarks, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/
world/europe/01iht-germany01.html. He declared, “[n]o one should be able to rip us away from our culture
and civilization.” Id. According to Dempsey, Erdogan’s remarks “touched a raw nerve in Berlin.” Id.
137 KYMLICKA, supra note 3, at 125–26.
138 See id.
139 Id. at 125–26, n.41.
140 See McGuinty Rules out Use of Sharia Law in Ontario, CTV News (Sept. 12, 2005, 11:31 PM), http://
www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/TopStories/20050912/mcguinty_shariah_050911/ (discussing Sharia in Ontario);
Roger Cohen, Commentary, Shariah at the Kumback Café, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 7, 2010, http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/12/07/opinion/07iht-edcohen.html (discussing Sharia in Oklahoma).
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some Catholic and Jewish communities. The difficulty is with voices arguing
in favor of some sort of state-sanctioned application of such norms. It is the
advocacy of replacing voluntarism with mandatory, state-sponsored Muslim
religious law that raises opposition.
Manifestations of legal pluralism are present with regard to indigenous
populations or peoples in some countries. State successors of former empires
or colonial states have in some cases preserved forms of legal pluralism on the
basis of communities recognized by the state as entitled to separate juridical
structures, including bodies of legal norms and autonomous judicial systems.
Such systems usually overlap with educational autonomy and frequently with
linguistic separation. This often occurs with relatively new states that were part
of the Ottoman Empire or the British Commonwealth. The degree to which
former structures have been preserved varies from country to country. While
this system has the advantage of providing a considerable amount of respect
for the historic identity of the favored communities, it may imply, especially in
the case of communities based on religion, coercion on the conscience of
individuals reluctant or opposed to being defined as belonging to such
communities in disregard of their philosophical or religious convictions. This
Essay has provided, as examples, the cases of India, Israel, and South Africa as
reflecting such situations, despite their differences.
The issue of legal pluralism is related to the risk of a clash between too
much religious autonomy—as legitimate as the claim that such autonomy is a
right of religious communities may be—and the autonomy or the rights of the
individual. A democratic state should not sponsor or support policies that
abolish or excessively restrict the individual’s right to be left alone in the
sphere of fundamental convictions. While religious groups are more affected
than other groups, the issue is also of interest to ethnic and linguistic
minorities. A very liberal approach to group rights should not imply the
abolition of the right of the nation, the entire nation, to preserve its historical
identity, beyond the point that became legitimate in liberal democracies. At the
other end, belonging to a minority group should not prevent an individual from
opting out of the group, when possible, or from preferring the application of
the general civil law of the state rather than the particular, and often religious,
law of the group to his or her case. It would be necessary to correct the
coercive character of the particular group system and to provide individuals
with an option to preserve that right. Where historical reasons support the
maintenance of traditional systems of law without forcing the individual to
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submit to norms that are not those of the general population of the state,
democracy and human rights might be served.
Such an option exists for members of indigenous minorities. It should also
exist for members of recognized communities with a separate legal system. As
to immigrants, they are certainly entitled to enjoy general group rights in
accordance with international and constitutional law. But the demand to be
subject to the legal system of their original countries or systems of law as a
mandatory, state-sponsored, or imposed set of norms in some areas of life, as
proponents of ambitious models of legal pluralism suggest, would probably
lead to restrictions in immigration law, in addition to enormous legal
difficulties. It would also increase the tension, which already exists, between
the secular, liberal state and the autonomy of religious communities, churches,
or associations. The secular state should not be hermetic. There should be wide
room for religious and cultural autonomy, but autonomy is not absolute
separation or independence from the general rule of law. Voluntary communal
arbitration can be a valuable instrument to foster social peace and harmony.
The state cannot extend its sponsorship or sanction norms of behavior of
particular segments of the population that may not agree with the law of the
state and are not the result of the general legislative process.

